

must be built correctly, and PMCS executed. This is called the "hard right" and, as you will see, tired, cold, and hungry men will always want to take a little break. The break may mean missing a phase line or not making your "not later than" time, and nobody will know but you. If you allow this to happen, you lower your standards. You know what you should be doing, but you're not doing it. Nothing should keep you from doing all that you can every time. Complete every mission,

and execute every order (or implied order) you receive. Commitment is never lowering your standards, or your superiors' standards.

Being a light infantry platoon leader can be one of the greatest assignments an infantry officer can have. It teaches you leadership and hardship, maneuver and terrain evaluation at ground level. The fact that you can actually be in combat in less than 18 hours, in almost any part of the world, should really drive home the importance of the job of

light infantry platoon leader, and the importance of doing that job right.

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Tenets of AirLand Battle

If You Understand Football, You're Halfway There

CAPTAIN FRANK A. KREEGER

The increased emphasis on teaching AirLand Battle doctrine to newly commissioned lieutenants in the Infantry Officer Basic Course is an important step toward a more proficient and cohesive officer corps. But teaching this doctrine to lieutenants with less than six months in the Army, or to any other group of soldiers with limited experiences, is also a perplexing problem.

How do you explain doctrine to a soldier who has had no tactical experience that he can relate to it? A teaching technique occurred to me while watching a football game. I realized that the offensive nature of football and our doctrine are very similar. Below is an outline of the examples I have used to explain the tenets of AirLand Battle to newly commissioned lieutenants.

Initiative. A leader preserves the initiative by preventing the enemy from reducing his unit's freedom to act. With the freedom to act, he can dictate the terms of the battle. In football, the quarterback on a team is the offensive leader, and the offensive line protects him so he can retain the freedom to act.

With this freedom he can now dictate the action and execute the play.


Initiative does not stop with the leader; his subordinates must also use their initiative. The subordinates, if they are to use their initiative properly, must understand the commander's intent. In football, when the quarterback calls a play, the team must understand the purpose (or the intent) of that play.

For example, the quarterback wants to throw a down-and-out pass to his wide receiver to get a first down. The fullback's job on this play is to protect the quarterback by blocking. When the play starts, the fullback misses his block and realizes the quarterback is about to get sacked. The fullback then takes the initiative and runs into position to receive the ball. The quarterback, just before he is hit, throws a pass to the fullback and gets the first down. The fullback's first task was to block, and the purpose of the block was to enable the team to get a first down. If the fullback had not understood the purpose, he would not have been able to take the initiative and go on to get the first down.

Agility. To seize or retain the initiative, a unit must be able to react faster than the enemy it is fighting. This begins with the agility of the leader, which includes his ability to think rapidly through many courses of action (COAs) and likely enemy reactions to them. He must then determine the most effective and least costly course.

The quarterback calls a running play. When he comes to the line, he sees that the defense is prepared to stop the run and immediately realizes that his play (COA) will not work. He decides that the most effective play (COA) is a pass, calls an audible signal, and passes for a long gain. This play works because the team has rehearsed plans (SOPs) that can be carried out in response to a signal from the quarterback. In combat operations, a unit also has well-rehearsed plans and battle drills that enable the soldiers to respond quickly to a signal from their leader.

Depth. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. Planning operations in depth results in maintaining the momentum in



the offense and flexibility in the defense.

The coach and the quarterback in football have a game plan. Throughout the game they are constantly planning three or four plays ahead to ensure that they retain the momentum of the attack. In combat operations, leaders also need to plan for future operations. When given the order to continue the attack or to move from the defense to the offense, leaders must already have considered time, space, and resources and must have made a tentative plan so they can quickly seize the initiative or retain the momentum.

Synchronization. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum combat power at the decisive point.

It's third down and goal to go on the two-yard line. The quarterback wants to throw a pass over the middle to his tight end. It sounds simple, but it isn't. The actions of every player on the field must be perfectly timed and rehearsed. Everyone must understand the purpose of the play—which is for the tight end to catch a pass for a touchdown. Each

player has a different task to perform, but each task contributes to the overall purpose. The line blocks to give the quarterback the freedom to throw the pass. The quarterback fakes the ball to the fullback to pull the linebackers in and open up the middle for the tight end. The wide receivers run out-patterns to pull the defensive backs away from the tight end. Finally the tight end runs his pattern and catches the ball. If everyone does his job and understands why (or the purpose), the play will have a greater chance of succeeding. If not, the play will have a greater chance of failing.

This is true for combat operations as well. The units with the main effort, supporting efforts, artillery, close air support, counterattack force, must all be given tasks that work toward achieving the overall purpose. Everyone must understand his task and purpose. Finally, the operation must be perfectly timed and rehearsed.

In an attempt to validate this teaching technique, I explained the tenets of Air-Land Battle to IOBC students who had read the explanation in FM 100-5 and

had received a formal period of instruction on it. The reaction was favorable. They said the analogy to football had given them a better understanding of the tenets and how to apply them as platoon leaders.

Understanding our doctrine and how it applies requires dedicated study. Teaching doctrine is an even greater challenge.

We should not limit ourselves to military examples, especially when the students have limited military experience. This teaching technique can be included in a formal block of instruction or used as a supplemental handout. Understanding the students' level of experience and structuring the material to fit that level is a critical step in planning military instruction which is both relevant and understood by the target audience.

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